A phone can reveal clues about a healthcare visit without anyone opening the medical record. Location collected by an app can indicate where a device has been; combining that information with other data can support an inference about its user’s health. That is a different data trail from a clinic sharing a diagnosis or test result. KFF Health News’ original reporting
The distinction matters when deciding what a privacy setting actually controls. Permission to see a health record, permission to use a phone’s location and permission to track activity for advertising do not describe the same thing.
The location can be sensitive even when the inference is wrong
KFF’s 30 October reporting describes concerns about medical-location information feeding advertising for unproven treatments. Its account connects the commercial data trail with the experience of patients receiving unwanted health-related advertisements.
A location observation is not a verified diagnosis. A device at a hospital could belong to a patient, a visitor or a member of staff. The concern is that an inference can still influence how someone is categorized or targeted, even when it is incomplete or mistaken. Seeing an advertisement, however, does not by itself establish which information produced it.
That is why protecting only the contents of a clinical record leaves a separate question: what can be inferred from the activities around care?
HIPAA follows particular organizations and relationships
The US Department of Health and Human Services explains that HIPAA’s privacy and security rules apply to protected health information handled by covered entities and their business associates. These include health plans, most healthcare providers and certain companies providing services for them.
The same guidance says the rules generally do not protect geographic location information, internet searches or information voluntarily shared online on a personal device. It also preserves an important exception: an app supplied by a covered entity or its business associate can have a different position from an ordinary consumer app. HHS phone and tablet guidance
Being concerned with health does not, by itself, place every piece of consumer-app information inside the same protection as a clinic’s record. Equally, it would be wrong to say that all health apps or all information viewed on a phone are outside HIPAA. Who handles the information, and in what role, matters.
Three controls address different parts of the trail
HHS describes several ways to reduce collection and sharing. These controls have different purposes; none is a promise of complete anonymity.
- App location permission determines whether an app may access location through the device’s permission system. Reviewing access app by app can distinguish a function that needs location from one that does not.
- Cross-app advertising tracking controls concern linking activity across apps and websites. They are separate from allowing a navigation app to use location.
- Advertising identifier controls concern an identifier that third parties can use for advertising-related tracking. Changing that setting is not the same action as removing every historical data record.
HHS warns that turning off location functions can also limit useful features, including navigation or finding a lost device. Its menu examples vary by device and software; current settings should be read in that context. The guidance explicitly says a digital footprint cannot be eliminated entirely. Official controls and their limits
A specific enforcement order is not universal protection
In January 2025, the Federal Trade Commission finalized an order restricting Gravy Analytics and Venntel’s use, disclosure and sale of sensitive location data, with specified national-security and law-enforcement exceptions. The agency had alleged that geofencing was used to identify visitors to healthcare facilities and other sensitive sites. FTC’s account of the final order
That action illustrates why the location itself can matter. It concerns named companies and specified practices; it does not establish that every commercial data flow has stopped or that a particular person’s information was deleted.
For readers, the useful distinction is between preventing some future collection, controlling an authorized exchange and dealing with data already held elsewhere. Our account of patient-authorized record sharing addresses the second of those questions. A phone’s surrounding location trail requires its own attention.
